human thinking

   1) I Am a Thinking Thing

   But what then am I? A thing which thinks. What is a thing which thinks? It is a thing which doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels. (Descartes, 1951, p. 153)

   2) Thinking Is Not Independent of the Expression of Thought

   I have been trying in all this to remove the temptation to think that there "must be" a mental process of thinking, hoping, wishing, believing, etc., independent of the process of expressing a thought, a hope, a wish, etc.... If we scrutinize the usages which we make of "thinking," "meaning," "wishing," etc., going through this process rids us of the temptation to look for a peculiar act of thinking, independent of the act of expressing our thoughts, and stowed away in some particular medium. (Wittgenstein, 1958, pp. 41-43)

   3) The Experimental Differentiation of Concrete and Propositional Operations

   Analyse the proofs employed by the subject. If they do not go beyond observation of empirical correspondences, they can be fully explained in terms of concrete operations, and nothing would warrant our assuming that more complex thought mechanisms are operating. If, on the other hand, the subject interprets a given correspondence as the result of any one of several possible combinations, and this leads him to verify his hypotheses by observing their consequences, we know that propositional operations are involved. (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958, p. 279)

   4) In Every Age, Philosophical Thinking Exploits Some Dominant Concepts

   In every age, philosophical thinking exploits some dominant concepts and makes its greatest headway in solving problems conceived in terms of them. The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers construed knowledge, knower, and known in terms of sense data and their association. Descartes' self-examination gave classical psychology the mind and its contents as a starting point. Locke set up sensory immediacy as the new criterion of the real... Hobbes provided the genetic method of building up complex ideas from simple ones... and, in another quarter, still true to the Hobbesian method, Pavlov built intellect out of conditioned reflexes and Loeb built life out of tropisms. (S. Langer, 1962, p. 54)

   5) The Experimental Differentiation of Deductive and Inductive Reasoning

   Experiments on deductive reasoning show that subjects are influenced sufficiently by their experience for their reasoning to differ from that described by a purely deductive system, whilst experiments on inductive reasoning lead to the view that an understanding of the strategies used by adult subjects in attaining concepts involves reference to higher-order concepts of a logical and deductive nature. (Bolton, 1972, p. 154)

   6) The Power of Machine Thought

   There are now machines in the world that think, that learn and create. Moreover, their ability to do these things is going to increase rapidly until-in the visible future-the range of problems they can handle will be coextensive with the range to which the human mind has been applied. (Newell & Simon, quoted in Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 138)

   7) Thinking Is Sometimes Accompanied by Action and Sometimes Not

   But how does it happen that thinking is sometimes accompanied by action and sometimes not, sometimes by motion, and sometimes not? It looks as if almost the same thing happens as in the case of reasoning and making inferences about unchanging objects. But in that case the end is a speculative proposition... whereas here the conclusion which results from the two premises is an action.... I need covering; a cloak is a covering. I need a cloak. What I need, I have to make; I need a cloak. I have to make a cloak. And the conclusion, the "I have to make a cloak," is an action. (Nussbaum, 1978, p. 40)

   8) The Growth of Philosophy

   It is well to remember that when philosophy emerged in Greece in the sixth century, B.C., it did not burst suddenly out of the Mediterranean blue. The development of societies of reasoning creatures-what we call civilization-had been a process to be measured not in thousands but in millions of years. Human beings became civilized as they became reasonable, and for an animal to begin to reason and to learn how to improve its reasoning is a long, slow process. So thinking had been going on for ages before Greece-slowly improving itself, uncovering the pitfalls to be avoided by forethought, endeavoring to weigh alternative sets of consequences intellectually. What happened in the sixth century, B.C., is that thinking turned round on itself; people began to think about thinking, and the momentous event, the culmination of the long process to that point, was in fact the birth of philosophy. (Lipman, Sharp & Oscanyan, 1980, p. xi)

   9) Thought Is, in Great Part, a Public Activity

   The way to look at thought is not to assume that there is a parallel thread of correlated affects or internal experiences that go with it in some regular way. It's not of course that people don't have internal experiences, of course they do; but that when you ask what is the state of mind of someone, say while he or she is performing a ritual, it's hard to believe that such experiences are the same for all people involved.... The thinking, and indeed the feeling in an odd sort of way, is really going on in public. They are really saying what they're saying, doing what they're doing, meaning what they're meaning. Thought is, in great part anyway, a public activity. (Geertz, quoted in J. Miller, 1983, pp. 202-203)

    10) In Thinking, Everything Needs to Be Made as Simple as Possible

   Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler. (Einstein, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 17)

    11) The Conditions for the Construction of Formal Thought

   What, in effect, are the conditions for the construction of formal thought? The child must not only apply operations to objects-in other words, mentally execute possible actions on them-he must also "reflect" those operations in the absence of the objects which are replaced by pure propositions. Thus, "reflection" is thought raised to the second power. Concrete thinking is the representation of a possible action, and formal thinking is the representation of a representation of possible action.... It is not surprising, therefore, that the system of concrete operations must be completed during the last years of childhood before it can be "reflected" by formal operations. In terms of their function, formal operations do not differ from concrete operations except that they are applied to hypotheses or propositions [whose logic is] an abstract translation of the system of "inference" that governs concrete operations. (Piaget, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 237)

    12) Language Enables the Rehearsal of Thought and, Thereby, Commitment to Long- Term Memory

   [E]ven a human being today (hence, a fortiori, a remote ancestor of contemporary human beings) cannot easily or ordinarily maintain uninterrupted attention on a single problem for more than a few tens of seconds. Yet we work on problems that require vastly more time. The way we do that (as we can observe by watching ourselves) requires periods of mulling to be followed by periods of recapitulation, describing to ourselves what seems to have gone on during the mulling, leading to whatever intermediate results we have reached. This has an obvious function: namely, by rehearsing these interim results... we commit them to memory, for the immediate contents of the stream of consciousness are very quickly lost unless rehearsed.... Given language, we can describe to ourselves what seemed to occur during the mulling that led to a judgment, produce a rehearsable version of the reaching-a-judgment process, and commit that to long-term memory by in fact rehearsing it. (Margolis, 1987, p. 60)

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   1) Programs and the Complexity of Human Mental Processes

   In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)

   2) Artificial Intelligence Is an Engineering Discipline

   Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)

   3) A Sceptical View of Artificial Intelligence

   Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....

   When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)

   4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, Eventually

   Just as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)

   5) Problems in Machine Intelligence Arise Because Things Obvious to Any Person Are Not Represented in the Program

   Many problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)

   6) The Meaning of a Symbolic Description

   What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)

   7) The Principle of Artificial Intelligence

   [AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)

   8) Artificial Intelligence Recognizes the Need for Knowledge in Its Systems

   The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)

   9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract Form

   The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)

    10) There Are Many Types of Reasoning

   There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:

    Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."

    Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)

    11) Programs Are Beginning to Do Things That Critics Have Asserted to Be Impossible

   Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)

    12) The Synthesis of Man and Machine

   Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)

    13) The Thesis of Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence (GOFAI)

   The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)

    14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory Formation

   It is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)

    15) Four Kinds of Artificial Intelligence

   We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.

   ♦ Nonpsychological AI

   Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.

   ♦ Weak Psychological AI

   Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.

   ♦ Strong Psychological AI

... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)

   ♦ Suprapsychological AI

   Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)

    16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular Contexts

   Even if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)

    17) Form and Content Are Not Fundamentally Different

   Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)

    18) The Assumption That the Mind Is a Formal System

   Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)

    19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial Intelligence

   The primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.

   The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)

    20) Mathematical Logic Provides the Basis for Theory in AI

   The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....

   AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)

    21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary Propositions

   In artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)

    22) Definitions of Artificial Intelligence

   Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)

    23) The Computer Can Not Be a Model of the Mind

   Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)

    24) Computers Will Not Always Be Inferior to Human Brains

   The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)

   1) The Knowledge of Ourselves

   We come therefore now to that knowledge whereunto the ancient oracle directeth us, which is the knowledge of ourselves; which deserveth the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth us more nearly. This knowledge, as it is the end and term of natural philosophy in the intention of man, so notwithstanding it is but a portion of natural philosophy in the continent of nature.... [W]e proceed to human philosophy or Humanity, which hath two parts: the one considereth man segregate, or distributively; the other congregate, or in society. So as Human philosophy is either Simple and Particular, or Conjugate and Civil. Humanity Particular consisteth of the same parts whereof man consisteth; that is, of knowledges which respect the Body, and of knowledges that respect the Mind... how the one discloseth the other and how the one worketh upon the other... [:] the one is honored with the inquiry of Aristotle, and the other of Hippocrates. (Bacon, 1878, pp. 236-237)

   2) As a Science, Psychology Is Distinct

   The claims of Psychology to rank as a distinct science are... not smaller but greater than those of any other science. If its phenomena are contemplated objectively, merely as nervo-muscular adjustments by which the higher organisms from moment to moment adapt their actions to environing co-existences and sequences, its degree of specialty, even then, entitles it to a separate place. The moment the element of feeling, or consciousness, is used to interpret nervo-muscular adjustments as thus exhibited in the living beings around, objective Psychology acquires an additional, and quite exceptional, distinction. (Spencer, 1896, p. 141)

   3) Psychology Can Never Be an Exact Natural Science

   Kant once declared that psychology was incapable of ever raising itself to the rank of an exact natural science. The reasons that he gives... have often been repeated in later times. In the first place, Kant says, psychology cannot become an exact science because mathematics is inapplicable to the phenomena of the internal sense; the pure internal perception, in which mental phenomena must be constructed,-time,-has but one dimension. In the second place, however, it cannot even become an experimental science, because in it the manifold of internal observation cannot be arbitrarily varied,-still less, another thinking subject be submitted to one's experiments, comformably to the end in view; moreover, the very fact of observation means alteration of the observed object. (Wundt, 1904, p. 6)

   4) How a " Mathematical" Psychology May Be Realized in Practice

   It is [Gustav] Fechner's service to have found and followed the true way; to have shown us how a "mathematical psychology" may, within certain limits, be realized in practice.... He was the first to show how Herbart's idea of an "exact psychology" might be turned to practical account. (Wundt, 1904, pp. 6-7)

   5) The Rights of Psychology as Science

   "Mind," "intellect," "reason," "understanding," etc. are concepts... that existed before the advent of any scientific psychology. The fact that the naive consciousness always and everywhere points to internal experience as a special source of knowledge, may, therefore, be accepted for the moment as sufficient testimony to the rights of psychology as science.... "Mind," will accordingly be the subject, to which we attribute all the separate facts of internal observation as predicates. The subject itself is determined p. 17) wholly and exclusively by its predicates. (Wundt, 1904,

   6) The Study of Animal Psychology

   The study of animal psychology may be approached from two different points of view. We may set out from the notion of a kind of comparative physiology of mind, a universal history of the development of mental life in the organic world. Or we may make human psychology the principal object of investigation. Then, the expressions of mental life in animals will be taken into account only so far as they throw light upon the evolution of consciousness in man.... Human psychology... may confine itself altogether to man, and generally has done so to far too great an extent. There are plenty of psychological text-books from which you would hardly gather that there was any other conscious life than the human. (Wundt, 1907, pp. 340-341)

   7) The Behaviorist's Formulation

   The Behaviorist began his own formulation of the problem of psychology by sweeping aside all medieval conceptions. He dropped from his scientific vocabulary all subjective terms such as sensation, perception, image, desire, purpose, and even thinking and emotion as they were subjectively defined. (Watson, 1930, pp. 5-6)

   8) Man Is a Microcosm

   According to the medieval classification of the sciences, psychology is merely a chapter of special physics, although the most important chapter; for man is a microcosm; he is the central figure of the universe. (deWulf, 1956, p. 125)

   9) Brief Overview of Psychology's History

   At the beginning of this century the prevailing thesis in psychology was Associationism.... Behavior proceeded by the stream of associations: each association produced its successors, and acquired new attachments with the sensations arriving from the environment.

   In the first decade of the century a reaction developed to this doctrine through the work of the Wurzburg school. Rejecting the notion of a completely self-determining stream of associations, it introduced the task ( Aufgabe) as a necessary factor in describing the process of thinking. The task gave direction to thought. A noteworthy innovation of the Wurzburg school was the use of systematic introspection to shed light on the thinking process and the contents of consciousness. The result was a blend of mechanics and phenomenalism, which gave rise in turn to two divergent antitheses, Behaviorism and the Gestalt movement. The behavioristic reaction insisted that introspection was a highly unstable, subjective procedure.... Behaviorism reformulated the task of psychology as one of explaining the response of organisms as a function of the stimuli impinging upon them and measuring both objectively. However, Behaviorism accepted, and indeed reinforced, the mechanistic assumption that the connections between stimulus and response were formed and maintained as simple, determinate functions of the environment.

   The Gestalt reaction took an opposite turn. It rejected the mechanistic nature of the associationist doctrine but maintained the value of phenomenal observation. In many ways it continued the Wurzburg school's insistence that thinking was more than association-thinking has direction given to it by the task or by the set of the subject. Gestalt psychology elaborated this doctrine in genuinely new ways in terms of holistic principles of organization.

   Today psychology lives in a state of relatively stable tension between the poles of Behaviorism and Gestalt psychology.... (Newell & Simon, 1963, pp. 279-280)

    10) Psychological Research Is Not Building toward Systematic Clarity

   As I examine the fate of our oppositions, looking at those already in existence as guide to how they fare and shape the course of science, it seems to me that clarity is never achieved. Matters simply become muddier and muddier as we go down through time. Thus, far from providing the rungs of a ladder by which psychology gradually climbs to clarity, this form of conceptual structure leads rather to an ever increasing pile of issues, which we weary of or become diverted from, but never really settle. (Newell, 1973b, pp. 288-289)

    11) Psychology as a Scientific Discipline

   The subject matter of psychology is as old as reflection. Its broad practical aims are as dated as human societies. Human beings, in any period, have not been indifferent to the validity of their knowledge, unconcerned with the causes of their behavior or that of their prey and predators. Our distant ancestors, no less than we, wrestled with the problems of social organization, child rearing, competition, authority, individual differences, personal safety. Solving these problems required insights-no matter how untutored-into the psychological dimensions of life. Thus, if we are to follow the convention of treating psychology as a young discipline, we must have in mind something other than its subject matter. We must mean that it is young in the sense that physics was young at the time of Archimedes or in the sense that geometry was "founded" by Euclid and "fathered" by Thales. Sailing vessels were launched long before Archimedes discovered the laws of bouyancy [ sic], and pillars of identical circumference were constructed before anyone knew that C IID. We do not consider the ship builders and stone cutters of antiquity physicists and geometers. Nor were the ancient cave dwellers psychologists merely because they rewarded the good conduct of their children. The archives of folk wisdom contain a remarkable collection of achievements, but craft-no matter how perfected-is not science, nor is a litany of successful accidents a discipline. If psychology is young, it is young as a scientific discipline but it is far from clear that psychology has attained this status. (Robinson, 1986, p. 12)

1 thought.

leer el pensamiento a alguien to read somebody's mind o thoughts

2 pansy (botany).

3 thinking, ability to think.

* * *

► nombre masculino

1 (idea) thought

2 (mente) mind

3 BOTÁNICA pansy

* * *

* * *

1) (=facultad) thought

- como el pensamiento

2) (=mente) mind

3) (=cosa pensada) thought

4) (=propósito) idea, intention

5) (Bot) pansy

* * *

1)

a) ( facultad) thought

b) ( cosa pensada) thought

c) ( doctrina) thinking

d) ( máxima) thought

- pensamiento lateral

2) (Bot) pansy

* * *

= mind, thinking, thought, rationality, strands of thought.

Ex. Titles present filing problems (particularly in the minds of users).

Ex. Let us attempt to examine first the thinking and philosophy behind the arrangement of libraries designed in this period.

Ex. Amongst these are numbered: some specific legal and governmental works, such as laws, decrees, treaties; works that record the collective thought of a body, for example, reports of commissions and committees; and various cartographic materials.

Ex. A model of how librarians may actually go about book selection is presented in three ways: rationality; tacit knowledge; and symbolic content.

Ex. By looking at the work of some cyberfeminists, the author attempts to give a clearer picture of key debates and strands of thought in cyberfeminism.

----

* adivinar el pensamiento = read + Posesivo + mind, read + Posesivo + thoughts.

* corriente de pensamiento = trend of thought, stream of consciousness.

* de pensamiento liberal = liberal-minded.

* escuela de pensamiento = school of thought.

* expresar + Posesivo + pensamientos = find + Posesivo + (own) voice, find + voice, find + a voice.

* leer el pensamiento = read + Posesivo + mind, read + Posesivo + thoughts.

* libertad de pensamiento = freedom of thought, freedom to think, free thought.

* líder del pensamiento = leader of thought.

* línea de pensamiento = line of thought.

* método de pensamiento en voz alta = thinking aloud method.

* pensamiento abstracto = abstract thought.

* pensamiento analítico = analytic thinking.

* pensamiento científico = scientific thought.

* pensamiento creativo = creative thinking.

* pensamiento crítico = critical thinking.

* pensamiento deductivo = deductive thought.

* pensamiento de grupo = groupthink.

* pensamiento de orden superior = higher-order thinking.

* pensamiento errante = meandering thought.

* pensamiento errático = meandering thought.

* pensamiento grupal = groupthink.

* pensamiento humano = human thought.

* pensamiento intelectual = intellectual thought.

* pensamiento lateral = lateral thinking.

* pensamiento liberal = liberal thought.

* pensamiento libre = free thought.

* pensamiento matemático = mathematical thinking.

* pensamiento original = creative thinking.

* pensamiento que ronda la cabeza de uno = thought + run through + Posesivo + head.

* pensamiento racional = rational thought.

* serie de pensamientos encadenados = chain of thoughts.

* * *

1)

a) ( facultad) thought

b) ( cosa pensada) thought

c) ( doctrina) thinking

d) ( máxima) thought

- pensamiento lateral

2) (Bot) pansy

* * *

* * *

1 (facultad) thought

2 (cosa pensada) thought

siempre me adivina el pensamiento she always knows what I'm thinking, she can always read my mind o my thoughts

3 (doctrina) thinking

el pensamiento político de la época the political thinking of the time

4 (máxima, sentencia) thought

estas citas son pensamientos de autores célebres these quotes are the thoughts of famous writers

lateral thinking

B ( Bot) pansy

* * *

a) ( facultad) thought

b) ( cosa pensada) thought

c) ( doctrina) thinking

d) ( máxima) thought

* * *

pensamiento nm

1. [facultad] thought;

se debe potenciar la capacidad de pensamiento en los alumnos pupils should be encouraged to think;

sumido en sus pensamientos deep in thought;

no me pasó por el pensamiento it never crossed my mind;

leer el pensamiento a alguien to read sb's mind o thoughts

2. [idea] idea, thought;

el pensamiento socialdemócrata social democratic thought o thinking

según el pensamiento único… according to the current free-market liberal-democratic consensus…

3. [sentencia] maxim, saying

4. [flor] pansy

* * *

1 ( reflexión) thought

2 BOT pansy

* * *

pensamiento nm

1) : thought

2) : thinking

3) : pansy

* * *

pensamiento n thought

1 stupid, foolish, dumb, empty-headed.

2 stupid, foolish, inane, dumb.

stupid, nitwit, fathead, numbskull.

* * *

► adjetivo

1 stupid, silly

► nombre masculino,nombre femenino

1 berk, idiot

* * *

   1) Consciousness and the New Mysterians

   Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable.

... Without consciousness the mind-body problem would be much less interesting. With consciousness it seems hopeless. (T. Nagel, 1979, pp. 165-166)

   2) Consciousness and Sensory Qualia

   This approach to understanding sensory qualia is both theoretically and empirically motivated... [;] it suggests an effective means of expressing the allegedly inexpressible. The "ineffable" pink of one's current visual sensation may be richly and precisely expressed as a 95Hz/80Hz/80Hz "chord" in the relevant triune cortical system. The "unconveyable" taste sensation produced by the fabled Australian health tonic Vegamite might be poignantly conveyed as a 85/80/90/15 "chord" in one's four channeled gustatory system.... And the "indescribably" olfactory sensation produced by a newly opened rose might be quite accurately described as a 95/35/10/80/60/55 "chord" in some six-dimensional space within one's olfactory bulb. (P. M. Churchland, 1989, p. 106)

   3) Consciousness Appears to Be the Last Bastion of Occult Properties

   One of philosophy's favorite facets of mentality has received scant attention from cognitive psychologists, and that is consciousness itself: fullblown, introspective, inner-world phenomenological consciousness. In fact if one looks in the obvious places... one finds not so much a lack of interest as a deliberate and adroit avoidance of the issue. I think I know why. Consciousness appears to be the last bastion of occult properties, epiphenomena, and immeasurable subjective states-in short, the one area of mind best left to the philosophers, who are welcome to it. Let them make fools of themselves trying to corral the quicksilver of "phenomenology" into a respectable theory. (Dennett, 1978b, p. 149)

   4) Consciousness Can Be Resolved into Its Elementary Sensations

   When I am thinking about anything, my consciousness consists of a number of ideas.... But every idea can be resolved into elements... and these elements are sensations. (Titchener, 1910, p. 33)

   5) Consciousness Is an Aspect of the Darwinian Machine

   A Darwin machine now provides a framework for thinking about thought, indeed one that may be a reasonable first approximation to the actual brain machinery underlying thought. An intracerebral Darwin Machine need not try out one sequence at a time against memory; it may be able to try out dozens, if not hundreds, simultaneously, shape up new generations in milliseconds, and thus initiate insightful actions without overt trial and error. This massively parallel selection among stochastic sequences is more analogous to the ways of darwinian biology than to the "von Neumann" serial computer. Which is why I call it a Darwin Machine instead; it shapes up thoughts in milliseconds rather than millennia, and uses innocuous remembered environments rather than noxious real-life ones. It may well create the uniquely human aspect of our consciousness. (Calvin, 1990, pp. 261-262)

   6) Problems about Consciousness Arise from Use of the Personal Pronoun "I"

   To suppose the mind to exist in two different states, in the same moment, is a manifest absurdity. To the whole series of states of the mind, then, whatever the individual, momentary successive states may be, I give the name of our consciousness.... There are not sensations, thoughts, passions, and also consciousness, any more than there is quadruped or animal, as a separate being to be added to the wolves, tygers, elephants, and other living creatures.... The fallacy of conceiving consciousness to be something different from the feeling, which is said to be its object, has arisen, in a great measure, from the use of the personal pronoun I. (T. Brown, 1970, p. 336)

   7) The Capacity for Consciousness and Self- Consciousness Is Characteristically Human

   The human capacity for speech is certainly unique. But the gulf between it and the behavior of animals no longer seems unbridgeable.... What does this leave us with, then, which is characteristically human?.... t resides in the human capacity for consciousness and self-consciousness. (Rose, 1976, p. 177)

   [Human consciousness] depends wholly on our seeing the outside world in such categories. And the problems of consciousness arise from putting reconstitution beside internalization, from our also being able to see ourselves as if we were objects in the outside world. That is in the very nature of language; it is impossible to have a symbolic system without it.... The Cartesian dualism between mind and body arises directly from this, and so do all the famous paradoxes, both in mathematics and in linguistics.... (Bronowski, 1978, pp. 38-39)

   9) Views on Consciousness and Computation

   It seems to me that there are at least four different viewpoints-or extremes of viewpoint-that one may reasonably hold on the matter [of computation and conscious thinking]:

   A. All thinking is computation; in particular, feelings of conscious awareness are evoked merely by the carrying out of appropriate computations.

   B. Awareness is a feature of the brain's physical action; and whereas any physical action can be simulated computationally, computational simulation cannot by itself evoke awareness.

   C. Appropriate physical action of the brain evokes awareness, but this physical action cannot even be properly simulated computationally.

   D. Awareness cannot be explained by physical, computational, or any other scientific terms. (Penrose, 1994, p. 12)

1 silly, dull, empty-headed, foolish.

2 silly, footling, foolish.

3 useless, dumb.

4 stupefied.

fool, blockhead, dunce, idiot.

* * *

► adjetivo

1 silly, stupid, US dumb

■ ¡qué idea más tonta! what a stupid idea!

► nombre masculino,nombre femenino

1 fool, idiot

\

a tontas y a locas without rhyme or reason

hacer el tonto / hacer la tonta to act the fool

hacerse el tonto / hacerse la tonta to play dumb

ponerse tonto,-a familiar to get stroppy

tonto,-a de remate / tonto,-a de capirote familiar prize idiot

un,-a tonto,-a del bote familiar a right berk, a real twerp

* * *

1 mind (pensamiento, intelecto).

tener en mente algo to have something in mind

tener en mente hacer algo to intend to do something

traer a la mente to bring to mind

2 mentality.

abierto de mente open-minded

cerrado de mente set in one's ways o opinions

tiene una mente muy abierta she's very open-minded

* * *

► nombre femenino

1 (pensamiento) mind

2 (facultades) mind, intelligence, intellect

\

tener algo en mente to bear something in mind

* * *

* * *

1) (=pensamiento) mind

2) (=mentalidad)

3) (=intelectual) mind

* * *

a) (cerebro, intelecto) mind

b) ( persona) mind

* * *

= mind.

Ex. Titles present filing problems (particularly in the minds of users).

----

* abrir la mente = broaden + Posesivo + outlook.

* con la mente despejada = clear-headed.

* con una mente práctica = practically minded.

* cruzar la mente = shoot through + Posesivo + mind.

* de mente cerrada = close-minded, narrow-minded.

* descansar la mente = relieve + mind.

* despejar la mente = blow + the cobwebs away/off/out.

* ejercitar la mente = stretch + Posesivo + mind.

* en mente = in view, in mind.

* en + Posesivo + mente = on + Posesivo + mind.

* estrecho de mente = narrow-minded.

* grabar en la mente de Alguien = engrave in + Posesivo + mind.

* leer la mente = read + Posesivo + mind, read + Posesivo + thoughts.

* mente errante = meandering mind.

* mente errática = meandering mind.

* mente humana, la = human mind, the.

* mente inquisitiva = enquiring mind [inquiring mind -USA].

* mente pensante = mind at work, thinking mind.

* mente + quedarse en blanco = mind + go blank.

* mente sana = sound mind.

* ofuscar la mente = cloud + Posesivo + mind.

* representar en mente = visualise [visualize, -USA].

* tener algo muy vivo en la mente de uno = be strong in + mind.

* tener en mente = bear in + mind, have + in mind, keep in + mind.

* tener una mente abierta = keep + an open mind.

* venir a la mente = spring to + mind.

* venirle a Uno a la mente = come to + mind.

* * *

a) (cerebro, intelecto) mind

b) ( persona) mind

* * *

* * *

1 (cerebro, intelecto) mind

no podía apartar esas imágenes de la mente she couldn't get those images out of her mind o head

tiene una mente calenturienta he has an overactive imagination

tiene la mente ocupada en muchas cosas he has a lot of things on his mind

tiene la mente en otra cosa her mind's on other things

de repente me vino a la mente su nombre her name suddenly came to me

esas fotos me traen a la mente muchos recuerdos those photos bring back a lot of memories

tenía la mente en blanco my mind was a blank

no se le pasó por la mente que pudiera ser el culpable it never entered her mind o occurred to her that he could be the culprit

tener algo en mente to have sth in mind

¿tienes en mente algún modelo específico? do you have any specific model in mind?

tengo en mente comprarme un piso I'm thinking of buying an apartment

2 (persona) mind

es una de las mentes más destacadas del país he is one of the country's most outstanding minds

* * *

1ª persona singular (yo) pretérito indicativo

◊ tenía la mente en blanco my mind was a blank;

* * *

mente nf

1. [intelecto] mind;

tiene una mente analítica she has an analytical mind

2. [pensamiento] mind;

no consigo borrar de la mente el accidente I can't get the accident out of my mind;

me quedé con la mente en blanco my mind went blank;

tener en mente algo to have sth in mind;

tener en mente hacer algo to intend to do sth;

traer a la mente to bring to mind;

me vienen a la mente una serie de soluciones a number of possible solutions come to mind;

el nombre no me viene a la mente I can't think of the name

3. [mentalidad] mentality;

abierto de mente open-minded;

cerrado de mente set in one's ways o opinions;

tiene una mente muy abierta she's very open-minded

* * *

f mind;

no se me va de la mente I can’t stop thinking about it, I can’t get it out of my mind

* * *

mente nf

: mind

tener en mente: to have in mind

* * *

mente n mind

lateral thinking.

* * *

* * *

(n.) = lateral thinking

Ex. These methods might exclude documents which could only be recognized as relevant by the lateral thinking which, for the present at least, appears to be the prerogative of the human brain.

* * *

* * *

IJP - International Journal of Psycho-analysis

JAPA - Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association

SE - Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1953—74.)

PSOC - Psychoanalytic Study of the Child (New Haven: Yale University Press)

PQ - Psychoanalytic Quarterly

WAF - The Writings of Anna Freud, ed. Anna Freud (New York: International Universities Press, 1966—74)

PMC - Psychoanalysis The Major Concepts ed. Burness E. Moore and Bernard D. Fine (New Haven: Yale University Press)

\

О словаре: _about - Psychoanalytic Terms and Concepts

\

1. Abend, S. M. Identity. PMC. Forthcoming.

2. Abend, S. M. (1974) Problems of identity. PQ, 43.

3. Abend, S. M., Porder, M. S. & Willick, M. S. (1983) Borderline Patients. New York: Int. Univ. Press.

4. Abraham, K. (1916) The first pregenital stage of libido. Selected Papers. London, Hogarth Press, 1948.

5. Abraham, K. (1917) Ejaculatio praecox. In: selected Papers. New York Basic Books.

6. Abraham, K. (1921) Contributions to the theory of the anal character. Selected Papers. New York: Basic Books, 1953.

7. Abraham, K. (1924) A Short study of the development of the libido, viewed in the light of mental disorders. In: Selected Papers. London: Hogarth Press, 1927.

8. Abraham, K. (1924) Manic-depressive states and the pre-genital levels of the libido. In: Selected Papers. London: Hogarth Press, 1949.

9. Abraham, K. (1924) Selected Papers. London: Hogarth Press, 1948.

10. Abraham, K. (1924) The influence of oral erotism on character formation. Ibid.

11. Abraham, K. (1925) The history of an impostor in the light of psychoanalytic knowledge. In: Clinical Papers and Essays on Psychoanalysis. New York: Basic Books, 1955, vol. 2.

12. Abrams, S. (1971) The psychoanalytic unconsciousness. In: The Unconscious Today, ed. M. Kanzer. New York: Int. Univ. Press.

13. Abrams, S. (1981) Insight. PSOC, 36.

14. Abse, D W. (1985) The depressive character In Depressive States and their Treatment, ed. V. Volkan New York: Jason Aronson.

15. Abse, D. W. (1985) Hysteria and Related Mental Disorders. Bristol: John Wright.

16. Ackner, B. (1954) Depersonalization. J. Ment. Sci., 100.

17. Adler, A. (1924) Individual Psychology. New York: Harcourt, Brace.

18. Akhtar, S. (1984) The syndrome of identity diffusion. Amer. J. Psychiat., 141.

19. Alexander, F. (1950) Psychosomatic Medicine. New York: Norton.

20. Allen, D. W. (1974) The Feat- of Looking. Charlottesvill, Va: Univ. Press of Virginia.

21. Allen, D. W. (1980) Psychoanalytic treatment of the exhibitionist. In: Exhibitionist, Description, Assessment, and Treatment, ed. D. Cox. New York: Garland STPM Press.

22. Allport, G. (1937) Personality. New York: Henry Holt.

23. Almansi, R. J. (1960) The face-breast equation. JAPA, 6.

24. Almansi, R. J. (1979) Scopophilia and object loss. PQ, 47.

25. Altman, L. Z. (1969) The Dream in Psychoanalysis. New York: Int. Univ. Press.

26. Altman, L. Z. (1977) Some vicissitudes of love. JAPA, 25.

27. American Psychiatric Association. (1987) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 3d ed. revised. Washington, D. C.

28. Ansbacher, Z. & Ansbacher, R. (1956) The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler. New York: Basic Books.

29. Anthony, E. J. (1981) Shame, guilt, and the feminine self in psychoanalysis. In: Object and Self, ed. S. Tuttman, C. Kaye & M. Zimmerman. New York: Int. Univ. Press.

30. Arlow. J. A. (1953) Masturbation and symptom formation. JAPA, 1.

31. Arlow. J. A. (1959) The structure of the deja vu experience. JAPA, 7.

32. Arlow. J. A. (1961) Ego psychology and the study of mythology. JAPA, 9.

33. Arlow. J. A. (1963) Conflict, regression and symptom formation. IJP, 44.

34. Arlow. J. A. (1966) Depersonalization and derealization. In: Psychoanalysis: A General Psychology, ed. R. M. Loewenstein, L. M. Newman, M. Schur & A. J. Solnit. New York: Int. Univ. Press.

35. Arlow. J. A. (1969) Fantasy, memory and reality testing. PQ, 38.

36. Arlow. J. A. (1969) Unconscious fantasy and disturbances of mental experience. PQ, 38.

37. Arlow. J. A. (1970) The psychopathology of the psychoses. IJP, 51.

38. Arlow. J. A. (1975) The structural hypothesis. PQ, 44.

39. Arlow. J. A. (1977) Affects and the psychoanalytic situation. IJP, 58.

40. Arlow. J. A. (1979) Metaphor and the psychoanalytic situation. PQ, 48.

41. Arlow. J. A. (1979) The genesis of interpretation. JAPA, 27 (suppl.).

42. Arlow. J. A. (1982) Problems of the superego concept. PSOC, 37.

43. Arlow. J. A. (1984) Disturbances of the sense of time. PQ, 53.

44. Arlow. J. A. (1985) Some technical problems of countertransference. PQ, 54.

45. Arlow, J. A. & Brenner, C. (1963) Psychoanalytic Concepts and the Structural Theory, New York: Int. Univ. Press.

46. Arlow, J. A. & Brenner, C. (1969) The psychopathology of the psychoses. IJP, 50.

47. Asch, S. S. (1966) Depression. PSOC, 21.

48. Asch, S. S. (1976) Varieties of negative therapeutic reactions and problems of technique. JAPA, 24.

49. Atkins, N. (1970) The Oedipus myth. Adolescence, and the succession of generations. JAPA, 18.

50. Atkinson, J. W. & Birch, D. (1970) The Dynamics of Action. New York: Wiley.

51. Bachrach, H. M. & Leaff, L. A. (1978) Analyzability. JAPA, 26.

52. Bacon, C. (1956) A developmental theory of female homosexuality. In: Perversions,ed, S. Lorand & M. Balint. New York: Gramercy.

53. Bak, R. C. (1953) Fetishism. JAPA. 1.

54. Bak, R. C. (1968) The phallic woman. PSOC, 23.

55. Bak, R. C. & Stewart, W. A. (1974) Fetishism, transvestism, and voyeurism. An American Handbook of Psychiatry, ed. S. Arieti. New York: Basic Books, vol. 3.

56. Balint, A. (1949) Love for mother and mother-love. IJP, 30.

57. Balter, L., Lothane, Z. & Spencer, J. H. (1980) On the analyzing instrument, PQ, 49.

58. Basch, M. F. (1973) Psychoanalysis and theory formation. Ann. Psychoanal., 1.

59. Basch, M. F. (1976) The concept of affect. JAPA, 24.

60. Basch, M. F. (1981) Selfobject disorders and psychoanalytic theory. JAPA, 29.

61. Basch, M. F. (1983) Emphatic understanding. JAPA. 31.

62. Balldry, F. Character. PMC. Forthcoming.

63. Balldry, F. (1983) The evolution of the concept of character in Freud's writings. JAPA. 31.

64. Begelman, D. A. (1971) Misnaming, metaphors, the medical model and some muddles. Psychiatry, 34.

65. Behrends, R. S. & Blatt, E. J. (1985) Internalization and psychological development throughout the life cycle. PSOC, 40.

66. Bell, A. (1961) Some observations on the role of the scrotal sac and testicles JAPA, 9.

67. Benedeck, T. (1949) The psychosomatic implications of the primary unit. Amer. J. Orthopsychiat., 19.

68. Beres, C. (1958) Vicissitudes of superego functions and superego precursors in childhood. FSOC, 13.

69. Beres, D. Conflict. PMC. Forthcoming.

70. Beres, D. (1956) Ego deviation and the concept of schizophrenia. PSOC, 11.

71. Beres, D. (1960) Perception, imagination and reality. IJP, 41.

72. Beres, D. (1960) The psychoanalytic psychology of imagination. JAPA, 8.

73. Beres, D. & Joseph, E. D. (1965) Structure and function in psychoanalysis. IJP, 46.

74. Beres, D. (1970) The concept of mental representation in psychoanalysis. IJP, 51.

75. Berg, M D. (1977) The externalizing transference. IJP, 58.

76. Bergeret, J. (1985) Reflection on the scientific responsi bilities of the International Psychoanalytical Association. Memorandum distributed at 34th IPA Congress, Humburg.

77. Bergman, A. (1978) From mother to the world outside. In: Grolnick et. al. (1978).

78. Bergmann, M. S. (1980) On the intrapsychic function of falling in love. PQ, 49.

79. Berliner, B. (1966) Psychodynamics of the depressive character. Psychoanal. Forum, 1.

80. Bernfeld, S. (1931) Zur Sublimierungslehre. Imago, 17.

81. Bibring, E. (1937) On the theory of the therapeutic results of psychoanalysis. IJP, 18.

82. Bibring, E. (1941) The conception of the repetition compulsion. PQ, 12.

83. Bibring, E. (1953) The mechanism of depression. In: Affective Disorders, ed. P. Greenacre. New York: Int. Univ. Press.

84. Bibring, E. (1954) Psychoanalysis and the dynamic psychotherapies. JAPA, 2.

85. Binswanger, H. (1963) Positive aspects of the animus. Zьrich: Spring.

86. Bion Francesca Abingdon: Fleetwood Press.

87. Bion, W. R. (1952) Croup dynamics. IJP, 33.

88. Bion, W. R. (1961) Experiences in Groups. London: Tavistock.

89. Bion, W. R. (1962) A theory of thinking. IJP, 40.

90. Bion, W. R. (1962) Learning from Experience. London: William Heinemann.

91. Bion, W. R. (1963) Elements of Psychoanalysis. London: William Heinemann.

92. Bion, W. R. (1965) Transformations. London: William Heinemann.

93. Bion, W. R. (1970) Attention and Interpretation. London: Tavistock.

94. Bion, W. R. (1985) All My Sins Remembered, ed. Francesca Bion. Adingdon: Fleetwood Press.

95. Bird, B. (1972) Notes on transference. JAPA, 20.

96. Blanck, G. & Blanck, R. (1974) Ego Psychology. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.

97. Blatt, S. J. (1974) Levels of object representation in anaclitic and introjective depression. PSOC, 29.

98. Blau, A. (1955) A unitary hypothesis of emotion. PQ, 24.

99. Bleuler, E. (1911) Dementia Praecox or the Group of Schizophrenias. New York: Int. Univ. Press, 1951.

100. Blos, P. (1954) Prolonged adolescence. Amer. J. Orthopsychiat., 24.

101. Blos, P. (1962) On Adolescence. New York: Free Press.

102. Blos, P. (1972) The epigenesia of the adult neurosis. 27.

103. Blos, P. (1979) Modification in the traditional psychoanalytic theory of adolescent development. Adolescent Psychiat., 8.

104. Blos, P. (1984) Son and father. JAPA_. 32.

105. Blum, G. S. (1963) Prepuberty and adolescence, In Studies ed. R. E. Grinder. New York: McMillan.

106. Blum, H. P. Symbolism. FMC. Forthcoming.

107. Blum, H. P. (1976) Female Psychology. JAPA, 24 (suppl.).

108. Blum, H. P. (1976) Masochism, the ego ideal and the psychology of women. JAPA, 24 (suppl.).

109. Blum, H. P. (1980) The value of reconstruction in adult psychoanalysis. IJP, 61.

110. Blum, H. P. (1981) Forbidden quest and the analytic ideal. PQ, 50.

111. Blum, H. P. (1983) Defense and resistance. Foreword. JAFA, 31.

112. Blum, H. P., Kramer, Y., Richards, A. K. & Richards, A. D., eds. (1988) Fantasy, Myth and Reality: Essays in Honor of Jacob A. Arlow. Madison, Conn.: Int. Univ. Press.

113. Boehm, F. (1930) The femininity-complex In men. IJP,11.

114. Boesky, D. Structural theory. PMC. Forthcoming.

115. Boesky, D. (1973) Deja raconte as a screen defense. PQ, 42.

116. Boesky, D. (1982) Acting out. IJP, 63.

117. Boesky, D. (1986) Questions about Sublimation In Psychoanalysis the Science of Mental Conflict, ed. A. D. Richards & M. S. Willick. Hillsdale, N. J.: Analytic Press.

118. Bornstein, B. (1935) Phobia in a 2 1/2-year-old child. PQ, 4.

119. Bornstein, B. (1951) On latency. PSOC, 6.

120. Bornstein, M., ed. (1983) Values and neutrality in psychoanalysis. Psychoanal. Inquiry, 3.

121. Bowlby, J. (1960) Grief and morning in infancy and early childhood. PSOC. 15.

122. Bowlby, J. (1961) Process of mourning. IJP. 42.

123. Bowlby, J. (1980) Attachment and Loss, vol. 3. New York: Basic Books.

124. Bradlow, P. A. (1973) Depersonalization, ego splitting, non-human fantasy and shame. IJP, 54.

125. Brazelton, T. B., Kozlowsky, B. & Main, M. (1974) The early motherinfant interaction. In: The Effect of the Infant on Its Caregiver, ed. M. Lewis & L. Rosenblum New York Wiley.

126. Brenner, C. (1957) The nature and development of the concept of repression in Freud's writings. PSOC, 12.

127. Brenner, C. (1959) The masochistic character. JAPA, 7.

128. Brenner, C. (1973) An Elementary Textbook of Psycho-analysis. New York Int. Univ. Press.

129. Brenner, C. (1974) On the nature and development of affects PQ, 43.

130. Brenner, C. (1976) Psychoanalytic Technique and Psychic Conflict. New York: Int. Univ. Press.

131. Brenner, C. (1979) The Mind in Conflict. New York: Int. Univ. Press.

132. Brenner, C. (1979) Working alliance, therapeutic alliance and transference. JAPA, 27.

133. Brenner, C. (1981) Defense and defense mechanisms. PQ, 50.

134. Brenner, C. (1983) Defense. In: the Mind in Conflict. New York Int. Univ. Press.

135. Bressler, B. (1965) The concept of the self. Psychoanalytic Review, 52.

136. Breuer, J. & Freud, S. (1983—95) Studies on Hysteria. SE, 3.

137. Breznitz, S., ed. (1983) The Denial of Stress. New York: Int. Univ. Press.

138. Brody, S. (1964) Passivity. New York: Int. Univ. Press.

139. Brown, H. (1970) Psycholinquistics. New York: Free Press.

140. Bruner, J. S. (1964) The course of cognitive growth. Amer. Psychologist. 19.

141. Bruner, J., Jolly, A. & Sylva, K. (1976) Play. New York Basic Books.

142. Bruner, J. E., Olver, R. R. &Greenfield, P. M. (1966) Studies in Cognitive Growth. New York: Wiley.

143. Buie, D H. (1981) Empathy. JAPA, 29.

144. Burgner, M. & Edgeumble, R. (1972) Some problems in the conceptualization of early object relationships. PSOC, 27.

145. Call, J. ed. (1979) Basic Handbook of Child Psychiatry. New York: Basic Books.

146. Carroll, G. (1956) Language, Thought and Reality. Cambridge & London: M. I. T. Press & John Wiley.

147. Cavenar, J. O. & Nash, J. L. (1976) The effects of Combat on the normal personality. Comprehensive Psychiat., 17.

148. Chassequet-Smirgel, J. (1978) Reflections on the connection between perversion and sadism. IJP, 59.

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237. Freud, A. (1981) Insight. PSOC, 36.

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239. Freud, S. (1891) On the interpretation of the aphasias. SE, 3.

240. Freud, S. (1893—95) Studies on hysteria. SE, 2.

241. Freud, S. (1894) The neuropsychoses of defence. SE, 3.

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246. Freud, S. (1896) Heredity and aetiology of neurosis. SE, 3.

247. Freud, S. (1898) Sexuality in the aetiology of the neurosis. SE, 3.

248. Freud, S. (1899) Screen memories. SE, 3.

249. Freud, S. (1900) The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4—5.

250. Freud, S. (1901) Childhood memories and screen memories SE, 6.

251. Freud, S. (1901) On dreams. SE, 5.

252. Freud, S. (1901) The psychopathology of everyday life. SE, 6.

253. Freud, S. (1905) Fragments of an analysis of a case of hysteria. SE, 7.

254. Freud, S. (1905) Jokes and their relation to the unconscious. SE, 8.

255. Freud, S. (1905) Psysical (or mental) treatment. SE, 7.

256. Freud, S. (1905) Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE. 7.

257. Freud, S. (1908) Character and anal erotism. SE, 9.

258. Freud, S. (1908) On the sexual theories of children. SE, 9.

259. Freud, S. (1908) Preface to Wilhelm Stekel's Nervous Anxiety-States and Their Treatment. SE, 9.

260. Freud, S. (1909) Analysis of a phobia in a five-year-old boy. SE, 10.

261. Freud, S. (1909) Family romances. SE, 9.

262. Freud, S. (1909) Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis. SE, 10.

263. Freud, S. (1910) A special type of choice of object made by men. SE, 11.

264. Freud, S. (1910) The autithentical meaning of primal words. SE, 11.

265. Freud, S. (1910) The future prospects of psychoanalytic therapy. SE, 11.

266. Freud, S. (1910) The psychoanalytic view of psychogenic disturbance of vision. SE, 11.

267. Freud, S. (1911) Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning. SE, 12.

268. Freud, S. (1911) Notes on a case of paranoia. SE, 12.

269. Freud, S. (1911) Psychoanalytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia. SE, 12.

270. Freud, S. (1911—15) Papers on technique. SE, 12.

271. Freud, S. (1912) Contribution to a discussion on masturbation. SE, 12.

272. Freud, S. (1912) On the universal tendency to abasement in the sphere of love. SE, 11.

273. Freud, S. (1912) The dynamics of transference. SE, 12.

274. Freud, S. (1913) Editor's note The disposition to obsessional neurosis. SE, 12.

275. Freud, S. (1913) On beginning the treatment. SE, 12.

276. Freud, S. (1913) Totem and taboo. SE, 13.

277. Freud, S. (1914) Fausse reconnaissance (deja reconte) in psychoanalytic treatment. SE, 13.

278. Freud, S. (1914) Mourning and melancholia. SE, 15.

279. Freud, S. (1914) Observations on transference love. SE, 12.

280. Freud, S. (1914) On narcissism. SE. 14.

281. Freud, S. (1914) On the history of the psychoanalytic movement. SE, 14.

282. Freud, S. (1914) Remembering, repeating, and working-through. SE, 12.

283. Freud, S. (1914—16) Some character types met with in psychoanalysis. (II) Those wrecked by success SE, 14.

284. Freud, S. (1915) Das UnbewuЯte. Gesammelte Werke, 10.

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287. Freud, S. (1915) Repression. SE, 14.

288. Freud, S. (1915) The unconscious. SE, 14.

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292. Freud, S. (1917) A metapsychological supplement to the theory of dreams. SE, 14.

293. Freud, S. (1917) Introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. SE, 16.

294. Freud, S. (1917) Mourning and melancholia. SE, 14.

295. Freud, S. (1917) On transformations of instinct as exemplified in anal erotism. SE, 17.

296. Freud, S. (1918) From the history of an infantile neurosis. SE, 17.

297. Freud, S. (1919) "A child is being beaten". SE, 17.

298. Freud, S. (1919) Lines of advance in psychoanalytic therapy. SE, 17.

299. Freud, S. (1919) The uncanny. SE, 17.

300. Freud, S. (1920) Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18.

301. Freud, S. (1920) The Psychogenesis of a case of homosexuality in a woman. SE, 18.

302. Freud, S. (1921) Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18.

303. Freud, S. (1923) The ego and the id. SE, 19.

304. Freud, S. (1923) The infantile genital organization. SE, 19.

305. Freud, S. (1924) A short account of psychoanalysis. SE, 19.

306. Freud, S. (1924) Neurosis and psychosis. SE, 19.

307. Freud, S. (1924) The dissolution of the Oedipus complex SE, 19.

308. Freud, S. (1924) The economic problem of masochism. SE, 19.

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310. Freud, S. (1925) Negation. SE, 19.

311. Freud, S. (1925) Some psychical consequences of the anatomical distinction between the sexes. SE, 19.

312. Freud, S. (1926) Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE, 20.

313. Freud, S. (1926) The question of lay analysis. SE, 20.

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315. Freud, S. (1930) Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21.

316. Freud, S. (1931) Female sexuality. SE, 21.

317. Freud, S. (1931) Libidinal types. SE, 21.

318. Freud, S. (1933) Femininity. SE, 22,.

319. Freud, S. (1933) New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22.

320. Freud, S. (1933) The psychology of women. New introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. SE, 22.

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367. Greenacre, P. (1950) Special problems of early female sexual development. In: Trauma, Growth and Personality New York: Int. Univ. Press.

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378. Greenacre, P. (1972) Crowds and crisis. PSOC, 27.

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380. Greenacre, P. (1975) On reconstruction. JAPA, 21.

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385. Greenson, R. R. (1962) On enthusiasm. JAPA, 10.

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